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I. INTRODUCTION
It is surprising that there are cases like Boomer v. Atlantic
Cement Co.I The plaintiffs in Boomer were eight homeowners seeking
injunctive relief against the dust and noise produced by a neighboring
cement plant, the Atlantic Cement Company. The trial court declared
* Please direct all correspondence to: Jeffrey Rachlinski, Associate Professor of Law,
Cornell Law School, Myron Taylor Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853-4901; rachlins@law.mail.comell.edu.
The Authors thank Ian Ayres, Kevin Clermont, Stewart Schwab, Emily Sherwin, Eric Talley,
the participants in presentations of this paper at Stanford, Willamette, and Vanderbilt Law
Schools, and the 1998 annual meetings of the American Law and Economic Association and the
Law and Society Association for their comments.
1. 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970).
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Atlantic Cement a nuisance, but refused to enjoin the plant's opera-
tions.2 Instead, the court awarded monetary damages to the plaintiffs
for the loss in value to their property attributable to the defendant's
activities. The dissatisfied plaintiffs appealed, but ultimately New
York's highest court declared that they were not entitled to injunctive
relief.3 That the plaintiffs sued the plant is not surprising; Atlantic
Cement's operations produced a tremendous amount of noise and
dust.4 The striking aspect of the case is that the plaintiffs spent the
time and money to appeal the type of remedy, even though they had
won the right to substantial damages. Clearly an injunction had spe-
cial value for the Boomer plaintiffs-but why?
This Article presents evidence that people do not regard rights
protected by damages remedies as being owned in the same way as
rights protected by injunctive relief. The former can be taken by
another without the right holder's permission, whereas the latter
cannot be taken without the right holder's permission. The power to
refuse to sell a right is a critical psychological component of owner-
ship, and damages remedies do not include this power. When the
trial court refused to grant the Boomer plaintiffs an injunction, it took
away their power to refuse to sell their rights to Atlantic Cement,
thereby undermining their status as owners.
Law and economics has an alternative account of the Boomer
plaintiffs' motives. Application of the Coase Theorem suggests that
the plaintiffs were hoping to use an injunction to extract a large set-
tlement from the defendant.5 According to Coase, parties regularly
trade their legal rights, and so the homeowners might have been
hoping to improve their bargaining position before ultimately selling
their rights to Atlantic Cement. The right to shut down Atlantic
Cement's plant would have been a valuable right, indeed, as the plant
had cost $45 million to build and supported a payroll of 300 employ-
ees.6 The eight homeowners could conceivably have demanded a size-
able portion of Atlantic Cement's future revenue stream in exchange
for allowing the company to continue operating. Furthermore, the
2. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 287 N.Y.S.2d 112, 114 (1967).
3. See Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 872.
4. See Daniel A. Farber, Reassessing Boomer: Justice, Efficiency, and Nuisance Law, in
PROPERTY LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION: EssAYs IN HONOR OF JOHN E. CRIBBET 7, 9-10 (Peter
Hay & Michel H. Hoeffich eds., 1988) (describing the impact of Atlantic Cement's operations on
its neighbors).
5. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
6. See Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 873 n.* (1970). The trial court believed that Atlantic
Cement would be unable to install equipment to reduce the dust and noise, and thus an




homeowners had reason to be dissatisfied with the size of the dam-
ages remedy that the lower court provided. The Boomer plaintiffs,
like most homeowners, probably valued their property at an amount
greater than the market-price damages that the courts used as a
measure of compensation. The present owner of a right is likely to be
the party who most values it (or else they would likely have sold it).
This suggests that the market-price damages would have undercom-
pensated the plaintiffs. In this view, the plaintiffs were using the
leverage that an injunction would provide either to extort Atlantic
Cement or to recover the subjective value they had for their homes.
Understanding the Boomer plaintiffs' motives is not a mere
academic inquiry. Boomer is a paradigmatic nuisance dispute. As
such, it plays a prominent role in debate concerning the appropriate
allocation of and protection for property rights.7 Courts and legisla-
tures must constantly decide how to allocate and protect rights, and
Boomer squarely presents both of these issues. The court in the
Boomer case could have given a right to pollute to Atlantic Cement or
given the right to clean air to the plaintiffs. If the court had given
rights to the plaintiffs, it could have protected them with monetary
damages (a liability rule) or injunctive relief (a property rule).8 The
Boomer plaintiffs' motives should matter a great deal to courts and
legislatures as they make these choices. Their motives reveal what it
is that property owners value, try to protect, and expect the law to
protect. If the law does not at least acknowledge these preferences,
then it will seem arbitrary and unjust.
If the Coasean account of the Boomer plaintiffs' motives is
accurate, then there is a clear framework for deciding how to allocate
and protect property rights. The law should try to encourage trading
by allocating rights in a way that reduces the costs of trade.9
Furthermore, as Calabresi and Melamed observed, the law should
also select a remedy that will reduce the costs of trade.10 The Coasean
account of Boomer, however, is probably wrong. It seems unlikely
that the homeowners were merely trying to obtain leverage in nego-
7. The case figures prominently in several casebooks on property and on remedies. See,
e.g., JOHN E. CRIBEr ET AL., PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALs 669-74 (7th ed. 1996); CHARLES
DONAHUE, JR., ET AL., PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND THE INSTITUTION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 857-66 (3d ed. 1993); JESSE DUxMENIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY
969-76 (3d ed. 1993); KENNETH H. YORK ET AL., REMEDiES: CASES AND MATERLALS 400-04 (4th
ed. 1985).
8. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1105-06 (1972).
9. See Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STuD. 1, 14 (1982).
10. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1106-10.
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tiations. The plaintiffs did not appeal the size of the damage award;
rather, they appealed the type of remedy. The courts, at least, did not
believe that the homeowners were trying to extract a large settlement
from Atlantic Cement; they were concerned that the homeowners'
pursuit of injunctive relief was an attempt to shut down an important
employer.
11
The critiques of the Coase Theorem arising from recent re-
search in behavioral decision theory provide a somewhat better ac-
count of the Boomer plaintiffs' motives. This research reveals that
people are reluctant to part with commodities they own-a phenome-
non known as the "endowment effect." 2  The endowment effect
suggests that apart from any idiosyncratic value the Boomer plaintiffs
felt for their homes, the court's market-price damages would have
failed to compensate them fully for the loss they felt. Like the
Coasean account, however, the endowment effect cannot entirely
explain the plaintiffs' motives. The court did not threaten the
plaintiffs' ownership of their property-it merely changed the remedy
protecting that ownership interest. Unlike the Coasean account, the
endowment effect can explain why the plaintiffs might have been
willing to spend more to defend their ownership interests than they
would have spent to procure them initially. Unless the plaintiffs
believed that injunctive relief was the only means by which they could
obtain sufficient monetary compensation, however, the endowment
effect alone cannot explain the plaintiffs' dogged pursuit of injunctive
relief.
11. In denying the injunction, the trial court stated its concern with "[t]he defendant's im-
mense investment in the Hudson River Valley, its contributions to the Capital Districfs econ-
omy, and... the payment of substantial sums in school and property taxes." Boomer, 287
N.Y.S.2d at 114. Likewise, the intermediate appellate court cited "the large number of persons
employed by [Atlantic Cement], its extensive business operations and substantial investment in
plant and equipment... and its payment of substantial sums of real property and school taxes"
as justification for denying the plaintiffs an injunction. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 294
N.Y.S.2d 452, 453 (1968). In its opinion, New Yorks highest court seemed explicitly aware of
the possibility that the parties would bargain around an injunction against Atlantic Cement.
See Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 873 ("The parties could settle this private litigation at any time if de-
fendant paid enough money and the imminent threat of closing the plant would build up the
pressure on defendant.").
12. See Daniel Kalmeman, et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo
Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIvES, winter 1991, at 193 [hereinafter Kahneman et al., Endowment
Effect]; Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase
Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 98 (1990) [hereinafter Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests];
Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1
(1980). For reviews, see Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs.
Willingness to Accept: Legal And Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 59 (1993); Russell
Korobkin, Note, Policymaking and the Offer/Ask Price Gap: Toward a Theory of Efficient
Entitlement Allocation, 46 STAN. L. REv. 663 (1994).
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In losing the right to an injunctive remedy, the plaintiffs lost
something more than leverage in their negotiations with Atlantic
Cement, and lost something distinct from an attachment to their
homes; they lost the power to refuse to sell their rights to the quiet
enjoyment of their property. The trial court's remedy in Boomer left
the homeowners with a property right subject to an option held by
Atlantic Cement. 13 The trial court allowed Atlantic Cement to violate
the habitability of the plaintiffs' homes without negotiating with them
or even asking their permission. The plaintiffs' persistence in appeal-
ing suggests that the right to refuse to sell one's property is a critical
psychological component of ownership. When the trial court declared
monetary damages to be the exclusive remedy for the plaintiffs, it
took away their right of refusal, thereby undermining their status as
owners. This account of the Boomer plaintiffs' motives does not mean
that they would not ultimately have sold their rights to Atlantic
Cement had they won an injunction. Rather, it suggests that they
wanted the court to force Atlantic Cement to seek their permission for
such a sale.
Research on the endowment effect shows that owners resist
parting with their possessions, but an important component of this
phenomenon might be that ownership usually includes the ability to
refuse to sell a possession. In other words, the endowment effect
might depend upon whether the law protects an ownership interest
with a property rule or a liability rule. The actions of the Boomer
plaintiffs, previous research on the endowment effect, 14 and the data
presented in this paper suggest that it does. If so, this has significant
implications for the law and economics of property and remedies. The
endowment effect itself implies that a fundamental aspect of the
Coase Theorem is wrong-the initial allocation of a right appears to
change people's preferences. If the endowment effect depends upon
injunctive relief, however, Coase accurately described rights protected
by liability rules, but inaccurately described rights protected by prop-
erty rules.
The present analysis therefore can be thought of as filling in
the lower right-hand box of Table 1, below. Table 1 presents the two
basic choices that the law must make concerning property rights. The
law must decide who owns what (the allocation question) and how to
protect ownership (the remedy question). Coase provided a frame-
work for answering the allocation question and Calabresi and
13. See Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175,2179 (1997).
14. See infra notes 61-79 and accompanying text.
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Melamed extended this analysis to the remedy question. The endow-
ment effect presents a challenge to the law and economics framework,
but the extent of this challenge remains uncertain. The scope of
rights subject to the endowment effect is as yet unknown. Of particu-
lar concern to the law will be the question of whether the endowment
effect influences people's attachment to rights that are protected by
damages remedies.
Table 1: Analysis of Property Rights
Legal Decision on Rights
Allocation Remedy
Law and Economics Framework
Coae~horen Calabresi & Melamed
Critique from Behavioral Decision Theory
Endowment Effect -F The Present Project
II. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF REMEDIES AND PROPERTY-A
BRIEF OVERVIEW
Coase's work provides the foundation for the economic analysis
of property rights. 15 The Coase Theorem begins with the premise
that, absent any impediment to trade, a legal right will be traded to
the party who most values it, regardless of the law's initial allocation
of that right.'6 This observation leads to two basic predictions about
the law's allocation of rights (in the absence of transaction
costs)--invariance and efficiency.' 7 According to the invariance thesis,
the law's initial allocation of rights cannot affect the ultimate distri-
15. See Coase, supra note 5.
16. See id. at 2-7.
17. See Donald H. Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J.L. & ECON. 427, 427
(1972); see also Stewart J. Schwab, Collective Bargaining and the Coase Theorem, 72 CORNELL
L. REV. 245, 273 (1987) (reviewing these points).
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bution of rights.18 According to the efficiency thesis, the law's alloca-
tion of rights cannot facilitate or impede an efficient distribution of
rights.
For example, imagine that the law gives the right to clean air
to eight homeowners living downwind from a cement factory.
Suppose that the homeowners would be willing to sell this right for
$10,00019 and the factory would be willing to buy it for $20,000. The
factory will buy the homeowners' rights for some amount greater than
or equal to $10,000 and less than or equal to $20,000. If the law in-
stead grants the factory the right to pollute, the homeowners will not
purchase the right to clean air from the factory because the factory
will demand at least $20,000 to part with it and the homeowners will
be unwilling to pay more than $10,000.20 The homeowners are poorer
if the law allocates the right to the factory, but in both cases the
factory will end up owning the right, thereby supporting the in-
variance thesis. This distribution of the right to clean air is also effi-
cient in the sense that the right will be held by the party who most
values it (the factory), regardless of the law's initial allocation.21
Holding aside any impediment to trade, the law's allocation of an
entitlement cannot create a social inefficiency.22
But as Coase noted, impediments to trade are always pre-
sent.23 In the example, if the "costP (loosely defined) of bargaining
between the factory and the homeowners exceeds $10,000, then the
benefits of a trade will not be worth its cost, and the parties will not
trade. Under these circumstances, if the law grants the homeowners
the right to clean air, the air will remain clean, which is an inefficient
result under these circumstances. This analysis naturally directs the
attention of courts and legislatures towards making allocation deci-
sions that reduce the costs of trade?-4 In its simplest form, this atten-
tion to transaction costs can lead to efforts either to allocate a right to
18. The invariance thesis has been the subject of some debate and is further discussed
infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
19. Assume for the moment that the homeowners have no problem organizing their inter-
ests and acting collectively.
20. This analysis assumes that the parties' willingness to pay for a commodity equals
their willingness to buy the same commodity.
21. If the landowner owns the right, then the landowner holds $10,000 in benefits and the
cement plant holds $0. If the cement plant owns the right, then the landowner holds $0 in
benefits and the cement plant holds $20,000. Thus, the total benefits are $20,000 if the right is
in the hands of the factory and only $10,000 if the right is in the hands of the landowner.
22. See Coase, supra note 5, at 8.
23. See id. at 15.
24. See Cooter, supra note 9, at 14; Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability
Matter, 1 J. LEGAL STuD. 13, 25-28 (1972).
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the party who is likely to be the owner who most values it, or to allo-
cate a right to the party who can most easily trade it.25
The problems associated with collective action are a common
source of impediments to trade that the law can address.26 If a group
owns a right that an individual wants, some members of the group
might hold out for exorbitant bribes from the individual, which might
thwart the transaction. For example, reconsider the example in
which the law grants the right, to clean air to eight homeowners.
Imagine that each values clean air at $1,250, and all must agree to
sell their rights in order for the factory to have a clear right to pollute.
Once again, there is a potential for $10,000 in gains from trade, but
this time, each of the eight homeowners might attempt to claim the
$10,000 during negotiations. The possibility that the factory will pay
seven of the homeowners all of the potential gains from trade while
one homeowner still holds out for more might keep the factory from
even entering into negotiations. Unless the homeowners can organize
their interests, a trade is unlikely to occur.
Collective action problems in the reverse direction also occur.
Suppose that the law allocates the right to pollute to the factory,
which values it at $20,000, and each of the eight downwind homeown-
ers values the right to clean air at $3,000. There is a potential gain of
$4,000 if the factory sells its right to the homeowners. If seven mem-
bers of the group organize and pay the factory $20,001 to stop pollut-
ing, they will collectively be $999 better off. The homeowner who does
not participate in this transaction, however, will realize a $3,000
benefit. This homeowner is a free rider on the efforts of her seven
neighbors. Because each of the eight homeowners would benefit from
free-riding, they might be unwilling to help buy the rights from the
factory. If too many members of the group free-ride, the group will be
unable to complete the transaction. Even though there are gains from
trade, unless the group can organize its actions and collectively share
the costs and benefits of the transaction, a beneficial trade is unlikely
to occur.
Calabresi and Melamed asserted that the law can address the
problems associated with collective action through judicious choices
between types of legal remedies.2 7 In particular, they argued that the
use of damages remedies can avoid the problem of holdouts.28 If a
legal right is held by a group but protected by a damages remedy,
25. See MARK KELMAN, A GUmE TO CRmcAL LEGAL STUDmms 122-23 (1987).
26. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1106-10.
27. Seeid.at1106.
28. See id. at 1106-07.
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then instead of bargaining with a group to purchase its rights, an
individual could simply take the group's rights and pay the damages.
In the example above in which each of the eight homeowners values
the right to clean air at $1,250, the law could achieve an efficient
result by allocating the right to clean air to the homeowners and
protecting it with a damages remedy of $1,250 per homeowner. The
factory would choose to pollute if it valued the right to pollute more
than the value of the right to clean air, and it could proceed without
fear of holdouts. Calabresi and Melamed approvingly cited the
remedy in Boomer as a good example of their analysis in practice.29
The court allowed the factory to pollute on condition that it
compensate the homeowners for their loss. Calabresi and Melamed
argued that the judicious allocation of rights and adoption of appro-
priate remedies can avoid transaction costs that would otherwise
impede the efficient transfer of rights.
Subsequent scholarship has refined the Coase/Calabresi ap-
proach to rights and remedies by introducing two additional consid-
erations: strategic barriers to trade and the inaccurate measurement
of damages. Ian Ayres and his colleagues have developed a model of
rights and remedies that introduces strategic barriers to trade into
the law and economics of property and remedies.30 This model sup-
ports using remedies as a means of inducing parties to reveal their
true value for commodities in a negotiation, thereby facilitating effi-
cient trade. Ayres and Talley proposed that liability rules tend to
induce people to reveal their preferences and make efficient trades,
more so than property rules.31 Ayres and Balkin extended this analy-
sis, demonstrating that legal rules that enable parties to take and
then retake commodities create a kind of auction, thereby increasing
the likelihood that a commodity will be left in the hands of the party
who most values it.32
Recent papers by Kaplow and Shavell and by Krier and
Schwab have described the consequences of inaccurate measurement
of damages.33 Both papers observed that courts might incorrectly
29. See id. at 1106.
30. See Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkdn, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703 (1996); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic
Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027
(1995).
31. See generally Ayres & Talley, supra note 30.
32. See generally id.
33. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An
Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 713-16 (1996); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab,




estimate the value of a right, thereby inefficiently encouraging or
discouraging the taking of that right. In the example above, if the
factory were causing $1,250 worth of damages per homeowner, but
the law provided for a damages remedy of only $250, then the factory
would pollute instead of negotiating with the homowners and pay the
$2,000 ($250 x 8) damages, thereby saving at least $8,000. The land-
owners might be able to bribe the factory not to pollute their air, but
transaction costs could thwart their efforts. In such a case the law
effectively subsidizes the factory at the expense of the landowners.
Likewise, if the law provided damages that were too high, transaction
costs could prevent the factory from taking the homeowners' rights,
even if it would be efficient for it to do so. These two papers agree
that inadequate measurement of damages can be a problem for the
law and economics'framework, although they disagree on the resolu-
tion of this problem. Kaplow and Shavell argued that despite the
potential inefficiencies that can result from inadequate measurement
of damages, liability rules are still superior to property rules in the
context of externalities such as pollution. 4 By contrast, Krier and
Schwab concluded that liability rules are superior when the danger of
transaction costs is high and that property rules are best when the
danger that the courts will improperly value harm is high. They also
argued that these two circumstances frequently coincide, leading to
indeterminacy.35
These recent contributions add considerations other than
transaction costs to the law and economics analysis, but encouraging
efficient trade remains the paramount goal of this framework. Coase
and Calabresi have converted discussions on the appropriate alloca-
tion of rights and choice of remedies into a discussion of how the law
can best encourage trade. But implicit in all this work is the assump-
tion that the parties have fixed preferences for commodities. The
allocation of rights can alter what people are willing to trade inas-
much as this allocation affects their total wealth. Also, a right is
probably more valuable if it is protected by a property rule than by a
liability rule. Beyond these caveats, however, the law and economics
framework assumes that people's preferences are exogenous-they do
not depend upon either the law's allocation of rights or on the legal
remedy that the law provides to protect those rights.
34. See generally Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 33.
35. See generally Krier & Schwab, supra note 33.
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HI. A CRACK IN THE CATHEDRAL: THE ENDOWMENT EFFECT
It is by now reasonably well-known that at least half of this
"exogeneity" proposition is false. Researchers in behavioral decision
theory have developed a growing line of evidence that people appear
to value a commodity that they own much more than an identical
commodity that they do not own.3 6 Researchers37 and legal scholars
s8
alike have even observed that this phenomenon, labeled the
endowment effect, 9 undermines a founding principle of the Coase
Theorem. Even excluding transaction costs, the allocation of a right is
"stickier" than Coase had assumed.
40
A. Demonstrations of the Endowment Effect
Researchers have used several different procedures to demon-
strate the endowment effect. In one set of studies experimenters
compared the amount people would be willing to pay to purchase a
commodity to the amount that they would be willing to accept to sell
the same commodity once they already owned it.41 In these studies,
the subjects' minimum "willingness to accept" exceeded their maxi-
mum "willingness to pay." This method has been used with actual
commodities given to individual subjects 42 and hypothetical commodi-
ties in a survey format.43 Other studies have shown that subjects are
generally unwilling to trade away a commodity that they own for a
commodity that they do not yet own." In these studies, experiment-
36. See Kahneman et al., Endownment Effect, supra note 12; Kahneman et al.,
Experimental Tests, supra note 12.
37. See Daniel Kahneman, et al., Experimental Tests, supra note 12.
38. See Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 12; Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law,
64 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1179-80 (1997).
39. See Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV.
39,44 (1980) (coining the term "endowment effect").
40. See Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 12, at 99.
41. See Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests, supra note 12; Kahneman et al.,
Endowment Effect, supra note 12; Jack L. Knetsch & J-. Sinden, Willingness to Pay and
Compensation Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures of
Value, 99 Q.J. ECON. 507 (1984); see also Korobkin, supra note 12, at 667-69 (reviewing this
work).
42. Both of the papers by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler report studies of this type. See
Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests, supra note 12; Kahneman et al., Endowment Effect, supra
note 12.
43. Researchers have conducted a host of these types of studies. See R.G. CUMMINGS ET
AL., VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CONTINGENT VALUATION
METHOD 35-36 (1986).
44. See Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests, supra note 12, at 1341-42; Jack L. Knetsch,




ers gave subjects one of two commodities and offered them a chance to
trade the commodity for a different commodity of similar value. The
number of trades in such studies was much lower than expected,
suggesting that people resist parting with commodities that they
already own.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the demonstrations of
these studies is their subject matter. The endowment effect occurs
with possessions as banal as coffee mugs, chocolate bars, and pens.45
Subjects given these items are generally unwilling to sell or trade
them. The endowment effect also occurs in surveys of the value of
public goods such as parks and wildlife.6 People also seem to endow
the current level of riskiness that they undertake in a given activity.4 7
For example, people are less willing to save money by switching to a
consumer product that is more dangerous than one they are currently
using than they are to spend money by switching to a consumer prod-
uct that is less dangerous than the one they are currently using.48
Thus, the effect has proven robust; it has been demonstrated with
different methods in diverse settings.
This diversity means that the endowment effect defies easy
explanation. The subjects in some of these studies might have been
making strategic offers, hoping to goad someone into selling low or
buying high. The subjects knew, however, that they would actually be
forced to implement all trades in which their offer (or asking) price
was less than (or greater than) the market-clearing price, thereby
removing much of the incentive for strategic behavior.49 Even when
the subjects had a chance to practice making offer/ask bids with to-
kens that had a clearly defined monetary value, a consistent endow-
ment effect was observed when the subjects subsequently made bids
on commodities such as a mug.50 Strategic behavior also fails to ac-
count for the subjects' unwillingness to trade commodities.
The fact that something as trivial as a mug is at stake rules
out explanations based on heirloom effects, the uniqueness of the
commodity, or wealth effects. It should not be surprising that some-
45. See Kahneman et al., Endowment Effect, supra note 12; Kahneman et al.,
Experimental Tests, supra note 12.
46. See CUMMNGS ETAL., supra note 43, at35-36.
47. See W.R. Dubourg et al., Imprecise Preferences and the WTP-WTA Disparity, J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 115 (1994); Edna T. Loehman et al., Willingness to Pay for Gains and Losses in
Visibility and Health, 70 LAND ECON. 478 (1994); W. Kip Viscusi et al., An Investigation of the
Rationality of Consumer Valuations of Multiple Health Risks, 18 RAND J. ECON. 465 (1987).
48. See Viscusi et al., supra note 47.
49. See Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests, supra note 12, at 1336-38.
50. See id. at 1329-36.
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one who spends $100 for a wedding band might be unwilling to part
with it ten years later for even ten times that amount. In the mug
studies, however, the endowment effect is almost instantaneous. The
mugs have had no real chance to become a part of the subjects' cher-
ished memories. Neither are the mugs rare or unique commodities.5'
They are among hundreds of identical mugs that subjects know are
available for purchase at a bookstore a few hundred yards from the
place where the experiment is conducted. Likewise, although giving a
party certain commodities might make them so wealthy that their
preferences should change, the mug has added only $6 to the subjects'
total wealth.
It is important to note that the endowment effect does not
mean that ownership increases the value of a commodity to its owner.
Psychologists, particularly Daniel Kahneman, have argued that there
is no such thing as fixed preferences that guide both purchases and
sales.52 The data indicate that the endowment effect is really only a
resistance to parting with a commodity, and ownership does not re-
flect a change in the value of a commodity to its owner.53 The endow-
ment effect is merely a part of how people construct preferences, and
it indicates only that when choosing whether to part with a commod-
ity, people are somewhat more resistant than a conventional rational
model would predict.
B. The Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem
To be sure, the endowment effect leaves many of the implica-
tions of the Coase Theorem intact. The phenomenon does not under-
51. A commodity's uniqueness might also play a role in the endowment effect. Economists
have proposed that uniqueness might entirely explain the endowment effect. See generally W.
Michael Hanemann, Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept: How Much Can They Differ?,
81 AM. ECON. REV. 635 (1991); Daniel S. Levy & David Friedman, The Revenge of the Redwoods?
Reconsidering Property Rights and the Economic Allocation of Natural Resources, 61 U. CmI. L.
REv. 493 (1994). Hanemann has shown that a commodity with no adequate substitute will
create a non-reversible indifference curve, much as the endowment effect does. Hanemann's
theory suggests that the endowment effect is even consistent with rational choice theory.
Although uniqueness surely cannot account for the results of the studies of more mundane
commodities such as mugs, there is evidence that it influences the size of the effect. See Wiktor
L. Adamowicz et al., Experiments on the Difference Between Willingness to Pay and Willingness
to Accept, 69 LAND ECON. 416 (1993). But see Jason F. Shogren et al., Resolving Differences in
Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept, 84 AM. ECON. REv. 255 (1994) (presenting data
that the endowment effect can be explained entirely by the uniqueness of commodities, at least
when an auction procedure is used to elicit preferences).
52. See Daniel Kahneman, Reference Points, Anchors, Norms, and Mixed Feelings, 51
ORGANIZATIONALBEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 296,299-300 (1992).
53. See Kalmeman et al., Endowment Effect, supra note 12, at 197 (citing an unpublished
study by Loewenstein and Kahneman).
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mine Coase's assertion that parties trade their legal rights. The en-
dowment effect does, however, pose problems for both the invariance
thesis and the efficiency thesis. As to invariance, the endowment
effect demonstrates that transaction costs are not the only determi-
nant of the ultimate distribution of rights. As to efficiency, the en-
dowment effect undermines the idea that there exists some owner
who most values a right.
Consider another version of the running example as an illus-
tration of these points. Suppose that Mr. Boomer is a homeowner
who expresses an endowment effect for the right to clean air. He
would be willing to pay $2,000 to obtain the right to clean air, but
would be unwilling to part with it for less than $6,000. Suppose that
Ms. Atlantic owns a factory that has the potential to pollute Mr.
Boomer's air. She also expresses an endowment effect, albeit a
smaller one. She would be willing to pay $2,500 for the right to pol-
lute, but would not part with the right for less than $5,000. If the law
allocates the right to clean air to Mr. Boomer, he would be unwilling
to sell it to Ms. Atlantic, thereby suggesting that he values this right
more than Ms. Atlantic. If the law allocates the right to clean air to
Ms. Atlantic, however, Mr. Boomer would be unwilling to purchase it,
thereby suggesting that she values this right more than Mr. Boomer.
To add to the confusion, in an auction, Ms. Atlantic would outbid Mr.
Boomer for the right. Because of the endowment effect, the law's
choice among methods of allocating this right determines the ultimate
owner rather than a consistent ordering of preferences.
The endowment effect thus undermines the invariance thesis
in a way that the literature on the Coase Theorem does not otherwise
discuss. Scholars have identified other problems with the invariance
thesis.M Allocation of valuable rights to someone obviously increases
their wealth, which should alter their choices. Furthermore, allocat-
ing a right to one activity (e.g., ranching) as opposed to a competing
activity (e.g., farming), can alter the equilibrium-relative rates of
these two activities in the long run (e.g., more ranchers and fewer
farmers).55 The endowment effect, however, goes beyond these argu-
ments. It implies that the law's allocation of rights will alter people's
apparent preferences in the short run, even if this allocation does not
change their total wealth. If the endowment effect is widespread,
then regardless of transaction costs, wealth effects, or the long-run
54. See Cooter, supra note 9, at 15 ("[T]here is agreement that the invariance version [of
the Coase Theorem] is untenable.").
55. See Regan, supra note 17, at 432-36. But see H.E. Frech, Pricing of Pollutions: The
Coase Theorem in the LongRun, 4 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 316 (1973).
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consequences of favoring one activity over another, the invariance
thesis is flawed.
The endowment effect also poses serious problems for the
efficiency thesis. If preferences are constructed rather than fixed,
then thorny questions arise about what an efficient distribution
means. For example, is the socially optimal owner of a commodity the
person who would pay the most for it or the one who would demand
the most to part with it? As shown in the above example, these are
not necessarily the same person and the Coase Theorem provides no
answer for this question. Coase himself might argue that his theory
was only meant to apply to competitive firms,56 which might be im-
mune from the endowment effect. 57 It is probably late in the day for
that argument, however, as the law and economics literature has
moved far beyond this restriction on the application of the Coase
Theorem.
Even if there were an appropriate measure of value, the
endowment effect always impedes the process of getting rights into
the hands of those who most value them. In the example above, if
"willingness to pay" is the best measure of value, then Ms. Atlantic is
the best owner of the right. She would, however, be unable to pur-
chase it from Mr. Boomer. Likewise, if "willingness to accept" is the
appropriate measure of value, then an inefficiency results if the right
is allocated to Ms. Atlantic; Mr. Boomer would value it the most un-
der this measure, but he would not be willing to purchase it from Ms.
Atlantic.
To be sure, the endowment effect could be considered just
another transaction cost, under a liberal definition of that term. Such
treatment would resurrect the truth of the tautological aspect of the
Coase Theorem (all efficient trades occur in the absence of transaction
costs). Unlike other impediments to trade, however, judicious alloca-
tion of rights and remedies seemingly can do little to facilitate trade.
Merely allocating a right results in an impediment to further trade.
Unlike other transaction costs, the law apparently has no power to
avoid creating an endowment effect.
If the endowment effect is small, or occurs only in rare circum-
stances, then it poses little threat to the law and economics frame-
work. But if the effect is large and widespread, its existence reveals
fundamental flaws in the law and economics framework. Intuitively,
56. See Stewart J. Schwab, Coase, Rents, and Opportunity Costs, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 55, 55
(1991).
57. But see Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests, supra note 12, at 1345.
19981 1555
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
it seems unlikely that the endowment effect applies to every commod-
ity. Although some studies have shown that the endowment effect
influences the activities of actual markets, 8 it seems unlikely that
bond or futures traders have any attachment to the commodities that
they buy and sell.59 A call option implies ownership and a put option
does not, but surely futures traders do not care whether they are
buying or selling a put or a call option, except inasmuch as the trade
can increase their wealth. By contrast, the endowment effect can
increase the value that people state for a commodity as much as
twenty-fold in other contexts.60 Understanding the extent to which
the endowment effect undermines the law and economics framework
requires a working theory as to when the effect will occur and how
large it will be.
C. Explanations for the Endowment Effect
In some ways, the data on the endowment effect is too impres-
sive. If the endowment effect is not the product of strategic behavior,
sentimental attachment, uniqueness, or wealth effects, then why does
it occur? Cognitive psychologists have attributed the effect to the
broader phenomenon of loss aversion-the tendency for people to
attach more importance to losses than to gains.61 In numerous con-
texts, psychologists have demonstrated that people sacrifice more to
avoid losses than to obtain gains of a similar magnitude.
62
Consequently, people tend to prefer the status quo, which would
produce an endowment effect. For example, Tversky and Kahneman
have shown that peoples' willingness to undertake a hypothetical job
with one of two disadvantages (either a long commute or little social
contact) depends upon whether they are already in a job that has the
same disadvantage. 63 Tversky and Kabneman attributed this result
to loss aversion-subjects were unwilling to part with their current
job's principal -benefit (either a short commute or social contact) to
obtain a different advantage. The status quo changes the preferences
that subjects express for the two benefits.
58. See Hersh Shefrin & Meir Statman, The Disposition to Sell Winners Too Early and
Ride Losers Too Long: Theory and Evidence, 40 J. FIN. 777 (1985).
59. See Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests, supra note 12, at 1328.
60. See CUMMIGS ETAL., supra note 43, at 35 tbl.3.2.
61. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A
Reference-Dependent Model, Q.J. ECON. 1039, 1041-44 (1991).
62. See id. at 1054-57.
63. See id. at 1045.
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Attributing the bias to loss aversion, however, only begs the
question of when loss aversion occurs and how large an effect it will
have on choice. As Kahneman observed, "loss aversion does not affect
all transactions."64 It seems unlikely to be an accident that the mug
study was conducted with mugs bearing a symbol of the university
that the subjects attended, rather than a blank mug. Similarly, even
though researchers have observed a large endowment effect for fancy
Swiss chocolate bars,65 they do not observe an endowment effect for
ordinary chocolate bars.66 In the absence of a theory explaining the
variance in the size of the endowment effect, its consequences for the
legal system cannot be adequately assessed.
There do appear to be some patterns in the size of the endow-
ment effect and the extent of loss aversion observed. Encouraging the
subjects to believe that they have earned the commodity or are other-
wise entitled to it in some way increases the size of the effect dra-
matically,67 creating a kind of "enhanced loss aversion."68 A sense of
entitlement increases resistance to parting with a possession.
Regret also seems to play an important role in the endowment
effect. For example, people refuse to exchange lottery tickets-not
because they have some attachment to the paper on which the ticket
is printed, but because trading a ticket away makes people worry that
they have traded away a winning ticket.69 A recent study by Korobkin
shows that in a legal context, people resist deviating from default
rules in contract negotiations.70 Korobkin attributes this, in part, to
the regret that parties might feel if they traded into a regime that has
some chance of leaving them worse off.71 People apparently regret
taking action more so than deciding not to take action.7 2 Thus, selling
a right has more potential for regret than failing to buy the same
right, thereby reinforcing the endowment effect.
Responsibility also seems to play a role in the endowment
effect. People feel responsible for selling a commodity when their
64. See Kahneman, supra note 52, at 301.
65. See Knetsch, supra note 44, at 1278-81.
66. See Shogren et al., supra note 51, at 259-61.
67. See George Loewenstein & Samuel Issacharoff, Source Dependence in the Valuation of
Objects, 7 J. BEHAv. DECISION MAING 157 (1994).
68. Kahneman, supra note 52, at 304.
69. See Maya Bar-Hillel & Efrat Neter, Why Are People Reluctant To Exchange Lottery
Tickets?, 70 J. PERSONALITY& Soc. PSYCHOL. 17 (1996).
70. See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contractual Default Rules, 83
CORNELL L. REv. 608, 637-47 (1998).
71. See id. at 657-60.
72. See generally David W. Harles, Actions Versus Prospects: The Effect of Problem
Representation on Regret, 82 AM. ECON RBv. 634 (1992).
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conscience suggests that they should not sell it, but they do not feel
responsible for failing to buy a commodity when their conscience
suggests that they should buy it. In one study demonstrating this
phenomenon, experimenters used a young potted tree to elicit an
endowment effect.738 Subjects either were given the tree and allowed
to sell it back to the experimenters or were given money and offered a
chance to buy the tree. For half of the subjects in both the buy and
the sell conditions, the experimenter informed the subject that if they
did not take the tree, it would be destroyed. This manipulation in-
creased the size of the endowment effect dramatically. Similarly,
some have attributed the exceptionally large endowment effect ob-
served in the studies of contingent valuation of environmental re-
sources, such as the Grand Canyon or the spotted owl, to the tendency
for the sellers to feel more responsible for the potential destruction of
the resources than do buyers.7 4
One impediment to explaining the endowment effect com-
pletely is that although studies such as those just described have
found parameters that influence the size of the effect, almost no study
has employed a manipulation that eliminates the effect. Studies us-
ing tokens that can be exchanged for a fixed amount of cash do not
generate endowment effects,75 but this suggests only that money is not
endowed. Some studies do suggest that there are forms of inchoate
ownership that do not create an endowment effect. In a footnote in
one of the principal endowment effect papers, Kahneman, Knetsch,
and Thaler reported that distributing vouchers that would later be
exchanged for mugs, rather than mugs themselves, resulted in only a
weak endowment effect.76 This curious finding suggests that the sub-
jects actually have to feel and touch the mug to make it theirs-the
right to a mug was not endowed. This finding, although only reported
as a footnote describing a pilot study, has important implications for
the law. Obviously many areas of law govern rights to collect a
commodity, rather than possession of the commodity itself. This
exploratory footnote should not be taken as conclusive evidence that
the right to collect a commodity is never subject to an endowment
73. See Rebecca Boyce et al., An Experimental Examination of Intrinsic Values as a Source
of the WTA-WTP Disparity, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 1366 (1992).
74. See Richard A. Epstein, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapters of Oregon: The Law and
Economics of Habitat Preservation, 5 Sup. CT. ECON. REv. 1, 44 (1997) (discussing this ten-
dency).
75. See Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests, supra note 12, at 1329-31; Vernon L. Smith,
Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory, 66 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 274, 277-
78(1976).
76. See Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests, supra note 12, at 1342 n.7.
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effect, but it does suggest that some forms of incomplete ownership
might not entail an endowment effect.
Other, indirect support also exists for this theory. Another
study showed when subjects are given a probability of obtaining a
commodity, they endow the gamble, but do not endow the commod-
ity77 Furthermore, one study used a procedure that eliminated the
endowment effect for mugs with a university seal.78 In this study the
experimenters employed a multi-trial auction procedure in which the
subjects learned the second-highest price after each trial. These
researchers were uncertain as to why their repeated-trials auction
eliminated the effect, but the instructions for their auction procedure
asked the subjects to generate bids as if they did not own the com-
modities at stake, regardless of their initial status as potential sellers
or buyers.7
9
These findings suggest that the endowment effect is sensitive
to variations in the form of ownership. Other than the variations
reported in these studies, most of the research on the endowment
effect has been conducted with a single type of ownership inter-
est-that of complete possession implicitly protected by a property
rule. The law obviously creates other forms of ownership, including,
most notably, ownership protected by a damages rule. Even though
the cognitive mechanisms underlying the endowment effect remain
unclear, there are strong indications that any variation from owner-
ship protected by a property rule can influence the size of the effect.
IV. THE PRESENT EXPERIMENT
The previous research on the endowment effect studied rights
that are protected by injunctive remedies. The research on the en-
dowment effect therefore does not necessarily apply to rights that are
protected only by damages remedies. Whatever other variables influ-
ence the size of the endowment effect, the remedy protecting the right
is one that is of great interest to the legal system. If the choice of
remedy influences the endowment effect, then the law does have some
means of controlling the endowment effect's impact on the trading of
rights.
77. See George Loewenstein & Daniel Adler, A Bias in the Prediction of Tastes, 105 ECON.
J. 929 (1995).
78. See Shogren et al., supra note 51, at 264-66.
79. See id. at 267-68.
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The remedy is likely to have a strong influence on the size of
the endowment effect. A right that is protected by a damages remedy
might convey less of a sense of ownership than does a right that is
protected by an injunctive remedy. Ownership of a right protected by
a damages remedy is not full ownership because the right is, in a
sense, shared with any potential interloper. Furthermore, this
potential for interference undermines the certainty that an injunctive
remedy conveys. An owner of a right protected by an injunctive
remedy knows that she will continue to own the right until she
voluntarily parts with it. Injunctive remedies convey a sense of
certainty and security that damages remedies do not.
The present study used the evaluation of a hypothetical choice
to determine whether the endowment effect depends upon the legal
remedy available. Two different sets of materials provided a test of
the hypothesis in different contexts. Each set of materials presented
different facts, but incorporated the same design. The materials
either informed the subject that they owned a set of rights and had a
chance to sell them ("sell" condition) or that they had an opportunity
to buy the same set of rights ("buy" condition). Subjects in the posi-
tion of a potential seller were offered a sizeable sum of money for
their rights-money that could then be used to purchase a different
set of rights. To correct for wealth effects, subjects in the position of a
potential buyer were told that they had a sizeable sum of money on
hand that was about to be used to purchase this same alternative set
of rights. Thus, the materials essentially required the subjects to
state a preference for one of two sets of rights, and manipulated which
ones they already owned (or were about to own).
The materials stated that the rights at stake were protected by
one of three types of remedies: an injunctive remedy, a large damages
remedy, and a small damages remedy. Only when the right was pro-
tected by an injunctive remedy was ownership certain. In the two
damages conditions, the materials stated that an interloper might
appropriate the rights and pay the damages. In these conditions,
subjects who chose to keep or to buy the rights might still be forced to
"sell" them involuntarily. The materials stated that an unwanted
appropriation was "unlikely" in the conditions in which the damages
were large and "likely" in the conditions in which the damages were
small. Thus, the study incorporated a 2 x 2 x 3 factorial design: one
of two different scenarios with the subject as a potential buyer or
seller of rights that were protected by an injunction, a large damage





The subjects were 804 undergraduates at the University of
Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, enrolled in business administration
classes. Subjects evaluated the stimulus materials in exchange for
course credit. Each subject evaluated materials representing only one
of the cells in the factorial design.
2. Materials
In the first hypothetical (read by 344 subjects) the materials
asked the subject to imagine that she had graduated and become a
successful businessperson. Because of her skills the subject had been
asked to serve on the board of directors of a charitable land trust.
This trust purchases environmentally sensitive land so as to preserve
it in a natural state. The materials stated that a problem had arisen
with one of the trust's properties, a wetland known as Henry's Pond,
which the trust maintained as a nesting ground for migratory birds.
Unfortunately for the trust, a helicopter company had begun
operating on a nearby property. This activity was disrupting the
birds' nesting behaviors.
The materials in the "sell" condition informed the subjects that
the law entitled them to one of three remedies, described below,
against the helicopter company. Regardless of the remedy, the mate-
rials stated that the helicopter company would offer a large sum of
money to the trust in exchange for its rights against the company. If
the trust sold its rights, any future interference with the helicopter
company's activities by members of the trust would be met with
criminal sanctions. Although continued operation by the helicopter
company would destroy the ecological value of the pond, the proceeds
from the sale of the rights would enable the trust to purchase an is-
land off the Canadian coast which was a breeding ground for seals.
The Canadian government had recently opened the area to lobster
fishermen, whose activities were disturbing the seals. Ownership of
the island would enable the trust to keep the lobstermen at a com-
fortable distance. Without selling its rights to the pond the trust
would otherwise lack the funds necessary to preserve this island.
In the "buy" conditions, the materials gave the subjects a simi-
lar choice, albeit in a mirror image. These materials stated that the
trust had no rights against the helicopter company's activities and
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that any attempt by members of the trust to interfere with the heli-
copter company's activities would be met with criminal sanctions.
Nevertheless, the helicopter company offered to sell the trust its
rights to operate and to move its operation away from the pond,
thereby restoring its ecological value. If the trust purchased these
rights they would be able to enforce the helicopter company's promise
to move with one of three remedies, described below. The materials
stated that the trust had enough money on hand to pay the helicopter
company, but that this money was earmarked for purchasing the
Canadian island, described above. Thus in both the sell and the buy
conditions, the subjects chose between protecting the pond and pro-
tecting the island.
The materials informed the subjects that one of three different
types of legal protection attached to any rights that they either re-
tained or purchased with respect to the pond. In the "sell" conditions,
the materials indicated that state law entitled the trust to either: (1)
a court order requiring the helicopter company to cease its operations
(injunctive condition); (2) monetary damages that were so extensive
that the helicopter company would probably be unwilling to incur
them (high damages condition); or (3) monetary damages that were so
low that the helicopter company would probably be willing to incur
them (low damages condition). In the "buy" conditions, the materials
stated that the agreement with the helicopter company could also be
enforced by one of these three remedies.
The principal dependent variable in the study was the subject's
willingness to sell or willingness to buy the right to protect the pond.
Subjects in the "sell" condition were asked to indicate on a five-point
scale whether they would definitely sell their rights to the helicopter
company, probably sell their rights to the helicopter company, were
not sure, probably not sell their rights to the helicopter company, or
definitely not sell their rights to the helicopter company. Subjects in
the "buy" condition were asked to indicate whether they would defi-
nitely not buy rights against the helicopter company, probably not buy
rights against the helicopter company, were not sure, probably buy
rights against the helicopter company, or definitely buy rights against
the helicopter company. The subjects' responses were then coded on a
five-point scale, with a higher score indicating a preference for buying
(or not selling) rights against the helicopter company.
The materials also included several questions designed to
measure the subjects' understanding of the background story. First,
subjects were asked to estimate the likelihood that the helicopter
company would continue to operate even if the trust owned the right
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to stop them. The subjects expressed this estimate by agreeing with
one of five statements of probability, which ranged from "extremely
unlikely" to "very likely." This was also coded on a five-point scale,
with a higher number indicating greater likelihood. Second, subjects
were asked what ecological value the pond would retain if the trust
did not own the right to stop the helicopter company. This was also
expressed on a five-point scale, ranging from "no ecological value"
(coded as a "1") to "a great deal of ecological value" (coded as a "5").
Finally, subjects rated their attitude towards environmental protec-
tion on a five-point scale, ranging from "very concerned" (coded as a
"1") to "not concerned" (coded as a "5") about the environment.
The second hypothetical (read by 460 subjects) was similar in
structure to the first. It included the same six conditions incorporat-
ing the 2 x 3 factorial design with initial allocation of a legal right and
type of remedy as the independent variables. The background story
differed, however. The materials asked the subjects to imagine that
they had graduated from school and become a partner in a small, new
biotechnology company. The subjects were told that as a result of
their efforts to move the partnership from pharmaceutical research to
research on new pesticides, the partnership's scientists had developed
a new organic pesticide from an endangered Hawaiian plant, the
Iwihi bush. The materials stated that the pesticide controlled a fun-
gus that afflicts wheat and that the new product had the potential to
replace a set of dangerous chemical pesticides that were filling a $20
million annual market. To market the pesticide, the partnership
would need a steady supply of the plant. Unfortunately, the plant
was only found on property owned by a chemical company that also
manufactured one of the chemical pesticides that the partnership's
product would replace.
The materials in the "sell" condition informed the subjects that
they had rights to a supply of the plants. This right was protected by
one of three remedies, as described below. The materials stated,
regardless of the type of protection, that the chemical company had of-
fered the partnership a large sum of money for its rights to the plant.
If the subject agreed to sell the rights to the chemical company, then
the chemical company would eradicate the plant, driving it into ex-
tinction. The partnership would then be unable to market the new
pesticide. The money that the chemical company offered, however,
would enable the partnership to fund future research, pay off debt,
and issue a public offering of stock, which had been the partnership's
goal from the outset. Thus, the subjects had to choose between at-
tempting to market the new pesticide (thereby preserving an endan-
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gered plant) and achieving financial stability and success for the
partnership (thereby allowing the extinction of an endangered plant).
In the "buy" conditions, the materials gave the subjects the
mirror image of the choice in the "sell" conditions. These materials
stated that the company had developed the new pesticide, but had not
yet secured sufficient access to the plant to engage in widespread
marketing. The chemical company offered to sell the partnership
rights to the plant, which could then be enforced by one of the three
remedies. The materials in the "buy" condition also stated that the
partnership was on firm financial footing, had paid off all of its debts,
and was about to issue a public offering of stock. The chemical com-
pany demanded a significant sum for rights to the plant, however,
which would force the partnership to undertake a significant debt
load and forego its public offering for the time being. The materials
stated that if the partnership declined to buy the stock, then the
chemical company would eradicate the plant, thereby driving it into
extinction.
The materials informed the subjects that one of three different
types of legal protection attached to any rights to the plant that they
either retained or obtained. Injunctive relief consisted of actual pos-
session of the plants. In the "sell/injunctive" condition, the materials
stated that samples of the plant had grown easily in the partnership's
greenhouse and that the chemical company could not legally interfere
with the partnership's access to an adequate supply of the plant. In
the "buy/injunctive" condition, the chemical company offered to sell
the partnership the land on which the plant grew, which would
thereafter prevent the chemical company from interfering with the
partnership's use of the plant. In both of the damages conditions, the
partnership's rights to the plants were contractual. In the
"sell/damages" conditions, the materials stated that the partnership
had entered into a "bio-prospecting" agreement with the chemical
company before the partnership had developed the pesticide. This
agreement required the chemical company to provide sufficient access
to the plant so that the partnership could market any product that it
developed. The materials stated that the damages for breach of this
contract would be based either on lost profits and would be large, or
would consist merely of restitution and would be small. In both of the
"buy/damages" conditions, the materials stated that the partnership
had not yet obtained a contractual right to a sufficient supply of the
plants. The chemical company had offered to enter into such a con-
tract, but it might breach after it learned that the partnership would
be producing a highly competitive product. The materials stated that
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the damages for breaking the contract would be based either on lost
profits and would be large, or would consist merely of restitution and
would be small. In all of the damages conditions, when the damages
would be large, the chemical company would be unlikely to break the
contract, but when the damages would be small, the chemical com-
pany would be likely to break the contract.
Once again the dependent variable was whether the subjects
were willing to sell their rights to the plant ("sell" condition) or buy
rights to the plant ("buy" condition). The subjects indicated their
preferences on a five-point scale, similar to that used in the Henry's
Pond hypothetical. The subjects' responses were then coded on a five-
point scale with a higher score indicating a preference for buying (or
not selling) rights to the plant. In this scenario, the subjects also
made a definite decision whether to retain (or obtain) rights to the
plant.
The materials also included two questions that examined the
subjects' understanding of the materials. Subjects were asked to esti-
mate, on a five-point scale, the likelihood that the plant would become
extinct should they sell, or refuse to buy, rights to the plant. This was
coded on a five-point scale with greater likelihood corresponding to
higher numbers. They were also asked whether they would be able to
market the new pesticide should they sell, or refuse to buy, rights to
the plant. Subjects made both estimates by checking one of five prob-
ability estimates: 0%, 0%-10%, 10%-25%, 25%-50%, or 50%-100%
(coded as "1" through "5", respectively). The materials also asked the
subjects to rate their attitude towards the environment on the same
five-point scale used in the Henry's Pond hypothetical.
In sum, both sets of materials forced the subjects to express
their preference for retaining a target set of rights as opposed to an
alternative set of rights. Subjects were not asked to set a dollar value
on these rights, as is sometimes done in contingent valuation studies.
In effect, the value of these rights was measured by the subjects'
willingness to part with (or unwillingness to obtain) the target set of
rights. The binary choice that both hypotheticals provided were more
constrained and stylized than the options that might be available in
the real world. The ultimate right holder is indeterminate in two of
the damages conditions if the subject chooses to retain or buy the
target rights, but if the subject sells or refuses to buy the target
rights, these rights will certainly end up in someone else's possession.
There might be more uncertainty as to the outcome in a real
situation. The materials also preclude the possibility that the
subjects could sell their rights and then attempt to reacquire them.
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The materials also did not give the subjects the opportunity to change
the type of remedy, as they might have been able to do in the real
world. The subjects in damages conditions did not have an
opportunity to buy their way into certainty by bribing the potential
interloper for refraining from interfering with the subjects' rights, and
the subjects in the injunctive conditions could not sell their right to
injunctive relief while retaining a damages remedy.
B. Results
Table 2 reports the mean of the subjects' choices in each cell of
the 2 x 3 design for both hypotheticals combined and separately. A
lower number indicates a preference for keeping the right in the "sell"
condition and a preference for buying that right in the "buy" condi-
tion. In the Henry's Pond hypothetical, a lower number indicates a
preference for saving the pond (as opposed to saving the seals), and in
the Iwihi plant hypothetical, a lower number indicates a preference
for saving the Iwihi plant (as opposed to making a public offering of
stock). The size of the endowment effect can therefore be calculated
by subtracting the mean in the "sell" condition from the mean in the
"buy" condition. A positive result reveals a preference for the status
quo, a negative result reveals the opposite preference. Across both
hypotheticals and all conditions, the subjects exhibited a significant
endowment effect,80 although it was only 0.22 points on a five-point
scale. More importantly to this study, the subjects also exhibited a
significant interaction between the initial allocation of the right and
the remedy.81 Only when the right was protected by an injunctive
remedy was an endowment effect observed. In the injunctive condi-
tion, the effect was 0.59 points, whereas it was -0.01 and 0.09 points,
respectively, in the high and low damages conditions.
80. F(1, 792) = 5.81, p < .025. These data were analyzed by an Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA) model. Throughout this paper, the term "significant" is used only to identify those
statistical conclusions that can be made at the 5% error level (p < .05).
81. F(2, 792) = 6.79, p < .025.
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Table 2: Mean Preference for Keeping (or Buying) the Rights
Both Hypotheticals
Initial Remedy
Position Inijunctive High Damage Low Damage All
Sell 3.75 (128) 3.18 (137) 3.16 (127) 3.36 (392)
Buy 3.16 (139) 3.19 (129) 3.07 (144) 3.14 (412)
Endowment
Effect + 0.59 - 0.01 + 0.09 + 0.22
Henry's Pond Hypothetical
Initial Remedy
Position Iniunctive High Damage Low Damage All
Sell 3.24 (54) 2.90 (58) 2.76 (50) 2.97 (162)
Buy 2.62 (63) 2.54 (55) 2.61 (64) 2.59 (182)
Endowment
Effect + 0.62 + 0.36 + 0.15 + 0.38
Iwihi Plant Hypothetical
Initial Remedy
Position Injunctive High Damage Low Damage All
Sell 4.26 (74) 3.46 (79) 3.56 (77) 3.76 (230)
Buy 3.71 (76) 3.84 (74) 3.54 (80) 3.69 (230)
Endowment
Effect + 0.55 - 0.38 + 0.02 + 0.07
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The two scenarios seemed to produce slightly different results.
In the Henry's Pond hypothetical, the endowment effect was largest in
the injunctive condition (0.62 points), but a small effect persisted in
the other two conditions (0.36 and 0.15 points, respectively, for the
high and low damages conditions). In the Iwihi bush hypothetical,
the injunctive condition also produced the strongest endowment ef-
fect. The low damages condition produced no real effect (0.02 points)
and the high damages condition produced a small, reverse effect (-0.38
points). This partial reversal undid the small endowment effect in the
high damages condition in the Henry's Pond hypothetical when the
data from the two hypotheticals were combined. The apparent differ-
ences between the two hypotheticals were illusory, however, as the
three-way interaction between the hypothetical, the initial allocation
of the right, and the remedy was not significant.82
Directly examining the preferences that subjects expressed
confirms these results. In the Henry's Pond hypothetical, only the
subjects in the injunctive conditions expressed a clear endowment
effect. In these conditions, 48.2% of the subjects (26 of 54) were
unwilling to sell their rights to the helicopter company,3 but only
28.6% of the subjects (18 of 63) were willing to purchase rights
against the helicopter company.Y In the high damages conditions,
32.8% of the subjects (19 of 58) were unwilling to sell their rights to
the helicopter company, as opposed to 20.9% (17 of 55) who were
willing to purchase these rights. In the low damages conditions,
30.0% of the subjects (15 of 50) were unwilling to sell their rights to
the helicopter company, as opposed to 26.6% (17 of 64) who were
willing to purchase these rights.
The data from the Iwihi bush hypothetical are similar. In the
injunctive conditions, 86.5% of the subjects (64 of 74) were unwilling
to sell their rights to the plant,85 but only 69.7% of the subjects (53 of
76) were willing to purchase rights to the plant.8 This result was
almost reversed in the high damages conditions, where 62.0% of the
82. F(2, 792) = 1.3 5 ,p> .25.
83. Meaning that they stated they would either definitely or probably refuse to sell their
rights to the helicopter company.
84. Statistical comparisons were not performed on the numbers reported in this and the
next paragraphs, as they are the same data reported in the previous paragraph and Table 2.
Within each of the three conditions, roughly equal numbers of subjects in the buy conditions
stated that they were uncertain as in the sell conditions.
85. Meaning that they stated they would either definitely or probably refuse to sell their
rights to the plant.
86. Within each of the three conditions, roughly equal numbers of subjects in the buy
conditions stated that they were uncertain as in the sell conditions. Overall, few subjects evalu-
ating this hypothetical stated that they were uncertain (19 of 460).
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subjects (49 of 79) were unwilling to sell their rights to the plant, as
opposed to 78.4% (58 of 74) who were willing to purchase these rights.
In the low damages conditions, 61.0% of the subjects (47 of 77) were
unwilling to sell their rights to the plant, as opposed to 65.0% (52 of
80) who were willing to purchase these rights.
In the Iwihi plant hypothetical, the subjects also made an ex-
plicit binary choice. Table 3 reports the percentage of subjects who
either chose to retain or obtain the rights to the plant. The endow-
ment effect can be calculated by subtracting the buy percentage from
the sell percentage; a positive number indicates an endowment effect
and a negative number indicates an opposite tendency. Subjects
overall preferred to own rights to the plant. Across all three remedy
conditions, this tendency did not depend on the initial allocation of
rights.87 The initial allocation, however, did interact significantly
with the remedy.8 In the injunctive conditions, 87.8% of the subjects
were unwilling to sell the rights to the plant, although only 70.7%
were willing to purchase them. In the high damages conditions,
64.6% of the subjects chose to sell rights to the plant and 78.4% chose
to purchase them. Finally, in the low damages conditions, only 67.5%
of the subjects chose to sell rights to the plant while 65.0% chose to
purchase them.
Table 3: Percent Who Keep or Buy Rights to the Plant (and n)
Initial Remedy
Position Iniunctive High Damage Low Damage All
Sell 87.8 (74) 64.6 (79) 67.5 (77) 73.0 (230)
Buy 70.7 (75) 78.4 (74) 65.0(80) 71.2 (229)
Endowment
Effect + 17.1 - 13.8 + 2.5 + 1.8
87. z = .79, p > .4. These data were analyzed with a loglinear model, which is suitable for
a binary dependent measure and categorical independent variables.
88. Both coefficients necessary to identify this interaction were significant in the loglinear
model, thereby suggesting that the initial allocation had a different influence on the subjects'
preferences in each of the three damages conditions. The first coefficient, distinguishing the
endowment effect in the injunction condition from that of the two damages cells, was significant.
z = 2.75, p <.01. The second coefficient, distinguishing the endowment effect in the high
damages condition from the injunction effect in the low damages condition, was also significant.
z = 2.81,p < .01.
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The manipulation checks revealed few significant effects of
either the initial position or the remedy in either hypothetical. In the
Henry's Pond hypothetical, the subjects' beliefs about the likelihood
that the helicopter company would continue operations in spite of the
trust's rights varied by the initial position89 and by remedy. Subjects
in the "sell" condition rated it significantly more likely that the
helicopter company would continue operations even if it kept its
rights than subjects in the "buy" conditions (a mean of 3.53 as op-
posed to 3.14). Subjects in the low damages condition believed it was
more likely that the helicopter company would continue operation
than did subjects in the high damages conditions (means of 3.77 and
3.23 on a five-point scale, with higher numbers indicating a greater
likelihood that the company would continue operations), and subjects
in both damages conditions believed it was more likely that the heli-
copter company would continue operations than did subjects in the
injunctive conditions (a mean of 2.91). The interaction between the
initial allocation and remedy on this variable, however, was not
significant.91
The second manipulation check in the Henry's Pond hypotheti-
cal unexpectedly produced a significant main effect for initial posi-
tion.92 Subjects in the "buy" condition were less likely to believe that
the helicopter company's activities would interfere with the pond's
ecological value than subjects in the "sell" conditions (by a mean of
0.25 points on the five-point scale). The results did not vary with the
remedy, however,93 nor was the interaction significant.94
In the Iwihi plant hypothetical, the subjects believed that the
endangered plant would become extinct if they did not retain or ob-
tain the rights to it. Overall, 48.7% indicated that they believed that
the plant faced at least a 50% chance of extinction (the highest cate-
gory available). Only 7.6% stated there was no chance the plant
would become extinct, and 18.1%, 10.0%, and 15.5% stated that the
chances of extinction were under 10%, between 10% and 25%, and
between 25% and 50%, respectively. The responses to this variable
did not differ significantly by the initial allocation of the right, the
remedy, or the interaction between these two variables. 95
89. F(1, 338) = 9.65,p < .005.
90. F(2, 338) = 15. 86 ,p <.001.
91. F(2, 338) = 1.1 2 ,p > .25.
92. F(1,338) = 6.3,p <.025.
93. F(2, 343) = 1.37, p > .25.
94. F(2, 343) 0.58, p > .5.
95. All F-values < 1.6; allp-values > .2.
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As to the implications of their decision to their own company,
fully 41.0% of the subjects agreed that if they did not obtain rights to
the plant, there would be no chance that they could market their new
pesticide. Another 34.6% stated that there was less than a 10%
chance that they would be able to market the new pesticide; 9.4%,
7.0%, and 8.1% stated that there was a 10%-25%, 25%-50%, and 50%-
100% chance that they would be able to proceed without rights to the
plant, respectively. Subjects in the "buy" condition were significantly
more likely to believe that they could proceed without the rights than
subjects in the "sell" condition (means of 2.25 versus 1.88 on a five-
point scale).96 Neither the remedy nor the interaction between the
initial allocation of the right and the remedy were significant.9 7
All four manipulation checks correlated significantly with the
subject's decision on whether to retain or obtain the rights at stake.
In the Henry's Pond hypothetical, the more the subjects believed the
helicopter company would encroach on the pond, the less interest they
had in owning the rights to protect the pond.98 Also, the less ecologi-
cal damage the subjects believed the helicopter company would cause,
the less likely they were to retain or obtain the rights against the
company.9 In the Iwihi hypothetical, the more the subjects believed
the plant would become extinct if they did not own rights, the greater
their preference for purchasing rights to the plant.1'0 Finally, the
more the subjects believed they would be able to market the pesticide
without rights to the Iwihi bush, the less interest they expressed in
owning these rights.10 1
Overall, the subjects expressed strong support for environ-
mental protection. Only 10.3% stated that they were "extremely
concerned" about the environment, but 52.3% stated that they were
"concerned." The remaining statements resulted in 27.2% agreeing
that they were "somewhat concerned," 8.2% agreeing that they were
"slightly concerned," and 1.4% agreeing that they were "not con-
cerned." Neither the hypothetical, initial allocation of the right, rem-
edy, nor any interaction between these terms significantly affected
subjects' concern with the environment. 02 Concern with the environ-
ment did not correlate with the decision as to whether to protect the
96. F(1, 453) = 10.4 8,p <.001.
97. All F-values < 1.00; all p-values > .4.
98. r =.19, t(342) = 3.63, p < .001.
99. r = .16, t(344) = 3.00, p <.005.
100. r = - .14, t456) = 3 .06,p <.001.
101. r = .14, t(456) = 3.09,p <.001.
102. All F-values < 0.4; allp-values > .5.
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pond in the first hypothetical. 103 In the second hypothetical, however,
greater concern with the environment correlated with a decision
either to retain or to obtain rights to the plant.104
C. Discussion
These data clearly support the hypothesis that the endowment
effect sometimes depends upon the legal remedy. The subjects in this
study exhibited an endowment effect for rights protected by injunctive
relief, but not for rights protected by a damages remedy. This result
confirms Kaplow and Shavell's assertion that "the inability of others
to appropriate my things lies at the core of the notions of 'ownership'
and 'property.'"105 The power to refuse to sell a right seems to be
psychologically important to ownership. Property is not truly owned
if someone can willfully appropriate it upon payment of a fee. When
the rights in this study were subject to an option by another party,
they did not produce a feeling of true ownership.
The size of the damages (and therefore the probability of an
unwanted encroachment on the target rights) was less important to
the subjects. Across both scenarios, the endowment effect was essen-
tially absent from both damages conditions. In the Henry's Pond
hypothetical, however, the "low" damages condition appeared to pro-
duce a smaller endowment effect than the "high" damages condition.
This suggests that in this scenario the important underlying variable
was the probability that the helicopter company would interfere with
the subject's rights. Low damages produced almost no endowment
effect because the rights were so uncertain. High damages decreased
the likelihood of an unwanted encroachment on the trust's rights,
thereby allowing the subject to endow the rights. When the
ownership interest was certain and an injunction was available,
endowment was complete. The Iwihi bush scenario, however, pro-
duced somewhat contradictory data on the effect of the size of the
damages.16 Thus, the data provide only mixed support for the theory
that among incompletely owned rights, the degree of uncertainty
influences the size of the endowment effect.
One potential problem with the stimulus materials is that they
confounded certainty and the type of remedy. It might be the case
103. r = .03, t(342) = 0.46,p > .5.
104. r = 0.21, t(458) = 4.6,p < .001.
105. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 33, at 716.
106. To be sure, the two hypotheticals did not produce results that were statistically differ-
ent. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
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that certainty of ownership leads to the endowment effect or that the
availability of injunctive relief triggers the effect. In a sense, property
rules are really the equivalent of liability rules with damages reme-
dies that are so high that no one would be willing to pay them.
Property rules have to be enforced by some remedy as well, and hence
could still be taken. In fact, the availability of injunctive relief and
certainty of ownership are usually confounded in real situations.
Nevertheless, because injunctive relief appears to grant the right
holder the absolute power to refuse to sell the right, it might have
special meaning for right holders. Future research to determine
whether certainty or permission is the key to the endowment effect
would be valuable.
The manipulation checks did not suggest alternative explana-
tions for the theory that the legal remedy influenced the endowment
effect. Minor variations in the facts necessary to set up each of the six
conditions might have made the rights at stake uniquely more or less
valuable than they were in the other conditions. For example, in the
Henry's Pond hypothetical, subjects were less willing to believe that
the helicopter company would infringe upon rights that the company
had voluntarily transferred to the trust than rights that the trust
owned as a matter of state law. Because the subjects' beliefs about
the likelihood that the helicopter company would interfere with the
trust's rights correlated with their decision on whether to retain or
obtain rights to protect the pond, this result could, in part, account for
the endowment effect observed in this study. There was no signifi-
cant interaction between the initial allocation and the remedy, how-
ever, so this artifact cannot explain why the size of the endowment
effect depended upon the remedy. In fact, none of the control
variables interacted significantly with the two independent variables,
even though they all correlated with the subjects' decisions. Thus,
they cannot explain the significant interaction between the independ-
ent variables. Nevertheless, it would be useful to conduct this ex-
periment with actual commodities, such as a mug or pen, so as to rule
out other explanations and tie the results more closely to the previous
work on the endowment effect.
One troublesome aspect of the data is that even holding the
endowment effect aside, the subjects did not express values for the
rights that seem rational. In particular, subjects evaluating the dam-
ages conditions seemed insufficiently sensitive to the size of the dam-
ages. A right protected by a large damages remedy is, almost by defi-
nition, more valuable than an identical right protected by a small
damages remedy. Nevertheless, an inspection of Table 2 reveals that
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subjects did not consistently express greater affinity for rights in the
high damages conditions than in the comparable low damages condi-
tions. It is also unclear what caused the trend tiowards a reversal of
the endowment effect in the high damages conditions of the Iwihi
plant hypothetical. Had the subjects actually had their own rights (or
money) at stake in the scenarios, they might have been more sensitive
to the actual value of the rights and the data might have been less
noisy. This aspect of the data, however, probably does not undermine
the conclusions related to the endowment effect. Research on the
endowment effect conducted with actual commodities and actual
money reveals the same endowment effect that survey research does.
Nevertheless, the anomalies in the data in this study also argue for
replication with actual commodities.
V. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The data in this study do not, however, imply that all rights
protected by damages remedies are immune from the endowment
effect. My right to my left arm is, in one sense, protected by a liability
rule, but it seems likely that there is an endowment effect for body
parts.0 7 Rather, the data in this paper support the thesis that rights
protected from intentional interference by damages remedies are not
endowed. In fact, the law gives even greater protection to body parts
than an injunction-body parts are inalienable. s08 Anyone who inten-
tionally takes my arm risks criminal liability, whether she does so
with or without my permission. It may be that the endowment effect
for inalienable possessions is even greater than it is for possessions
protected by injunctive relief.109
The results of this study restore the law's place as a mecha-
nism for facilitating trade. If the endowment effect is a ubiquitous
phenomenon, unaffected by the legal remedy attached to rights, then
the law has to contend with a constant barrier to trade. The results of
this study, however, indicate that the law has the ability to reduce the
endowment effect by favoring damages remedies. If the endowment
effect is properly viewed as an unwanted impediment to trade, or as a
107. The risk of a bodily injury produces an endowment effect. See Viscusi et al., supra
note 47.
108. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8.; Margaret Jane Radin, Personhood and
Property, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957 (1982); Margaret Jane Radin, Market.Inalienability, 100 HARV.
L. REv. 1849 (1987).
109. The endowment effect for commodities associated with life and limb elicit a large en-
dowment effect as compared to more ordinary commodities. See Shogren et al., supra note 51.
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transaction cost, then these results add to the case against property
rules. Removing the right to injunctive relief from a possession would
eliminate the attachment that people feel for their rights, thereby
facilitating trade.
This conclusion supports the arguments made by other schol-
ars who have compared property rules and liability rules. The papers
by Calabresi and Melamed, Ayres and Talley, and Kaplow and
Shavell all favored liability rules because of their ability to facilitate
trade.110 The results of this study could be taken as additional sup-
port for the claim that property rules impede trade. Property rules
create an endowment effect which impedes transactions, but liability
rules do not. The results also suggest that people resist entering into
more complicated transactions, such as selling a call option in a right
otherwise protected by a property rule. To the extent that disfavoring
property rules can be taken as the main implication of these data,
then this paper is consistent with the recommendations of previous
law and economics scholarship. There is, however, one inconsistency
between the conclusions of this paper and previous work comparing
property rules and liability rules. Frech has argued that the invari-
ance thesis is true for property rules, but not for liability rules."' By
contrast, this study indicates that the invariance thesis is correct for
liability rules, but not for property rules.
This study also supports the common law's general presump-
tion in favor of legal over equitable remedies. Equitable remedies are
traditionally difficult to secure."2 Whatever other justifications sup-
port the common law's bias against equitable relief, this bias might
also reflect the law's effort to defeat people's tendency to become
overly attached to their possessions. This assumes, of course, that the
available remedy actually affects people. If people are generally un-
aware of what remedy the law makes available, a change in the rem-
edy is obviously unlikely to have any affect on people's attachment to
their possessions."3 Alternatively, even though the data in this study
110. See generally Ayres & Talley supra note 30; Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8;
Shavell & Kaplow, supra note 33. In fact, the work of Ayres and Talley inspired the study
described in this paper.
111. See generally H.E. Frech I, The Extended Coase Theorem and Long Run
Equilibrium: The Nonequivalence of Liability Rules and Property Rights, 17 ECON. INQUIRY 254
(1979).
112. See DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAw OF REMEDIES 57 (2d ed. 1993) ("The equity system
treats access to its remedies as at least in part a privilege."). But see Richard A. Epstein, A
Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091 (1997)
(arguing that property rules are widespread and common).




suggest otherwise, it is possible that the laws allocation of the enti-
tlement has an influence on people that far overshadows the influence
of the remedy. 14
The endowment effect is more than just an impediment to
bargaining, however. It is an integral part of how people feel about
their possessions and rights. The presence of property rules and
injunctive relief (and perhaps even inalienability) in the common law
might itself be attributable, in part, to the endowment effect and loss
aversion. The law might reflect people's attachment to certain pos-
sessions, in which case it would be inappropriate to try to undermine
this attachment by changing the law.115 Even though equitable relief
is rare, it may be that the common law has made it available in those
situations in which the endowment effect is particularly strong. If so,
it might be inappropriate to tinker with the remedy in an effort to
undermine the effect.
To return to the Boomer plaintiffs, remember that they were
an angry group. At the outset of their lawsuit, they likely believed
that the law protected their interests in the habitability of their
houses and, consequently, they had endowed this right. Until
Atlantic Cement moved in next door, they lived secure in their belief
that, although they might someday sell their houses, the sale would
be on their terms and with their permission. The trial court's novel
remedy, while economically sound, was a psychological insult.
Property rights and remedies have a psychology as well as an econom-
ics. Ownership matters to people in ways that conventional economic
analysis overlooks, and remedies matter in ways that research on the
endowment effect has heretofore overlooked.
114. See generally Dale A. Nance, Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules: A Better View of
the Cathedral, 83 VA. L. REV. 837 (1997) (arguing that the allocation decision matters to people
much more than the remedy).
115. See David Cohen & Jack L. Knetsch, Judicial Choice and Disparities Between
Measures of Economic Values, 30 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 737 (1992) (arguing that many areas of
law recognize and accommodate the endowment effect).
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APPENDIX A: SAMPLE STIMULUS MATERIALS FOR HENRY'S
POND HYPOTHETICAL
("SELLIJNJUNCTIVE" CONDITION)
Executive Decision Making Problem
Imagine that you have graduated and moved on to become a
successful business person. Due to your success and ability, you have
been asked to serve on the board of directors for a non-profit environ-
mental organization, The Nature Land Trust. This organization iden-
tifies environmentally sensitive lands that are at risk of development
and purchases them from the landowner. The organization's many
volunteers then maintain the property in a natural state. With your
advice and assistance, your group has raised hundred [sic] of thou-
sands of dollars and now preserves thousands of acres of environmen-
tally sensitive properties throughout North America.
Recently, your organization purchased "Henry's Pond" in a
rural part of Southern Wisconsin. The area consists of 50 acres of
swampy, undeveloped land with a large pond in it. The Pond is fre-
quented by rare species of migrating ducks and geese many of which
use it as a nesting ground. Additionally, many geese stop at the pond
for several days during their annual migration. Your group spent
years raising the money to purchase Henry's Pond, and considers it
one of their most sensible acquisitions.
A problem has arisen with Henry's Pond. A helicopter com-
pany, Midwest Transport, Inc., has recently purchased and developed
property adjoining Henry's Pond. Midwest runs charter helicopter
flights from downtown Chicago to various cities throughout
Wisconsin. The Company has constructed a number of helicopter
pads and hangers, and now uses the site as its main heliport. Its
principle helicopter pad is just off of the northern end of the Trust's
Property, and is within 150 yards of the northern banks of Henry's
Pond.
Helicopters and birds do not mix well. The noise from the
nearby helicopters has driven many of the birds away from the pond.
Furthermore, those that remain have refrained from nesting, and are
unlikely to reproduce. Many birds have also gotten caught in helicop-
ter blades, killing them and damaging helicopters. Although it is
unlikely that bird-helicopter encounters would result in a disastrous
helicopter crash, the heliport has essentially destroyed the ecological
value of Henry's Pond.
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Midwest and the Trust have exchanged letters on the matter,
which have taken an increasingly angry tone. The Trust is unhappy
about Midwest's impact on its sanctuary and Midwest is unhappy
about the number of birds that the Trust's activities continue to at-
tract in spite of the noise. The Trust's Board of Directors has asked
its attorneys to review the situation and assess its options.
Fortunately, the attorneys agree that Midwest's activities
constitute a nuisance under Wisconsin law. Property law in the State
of Wisconsin protects "ecological" uses of land and is well-suited to
protecting private wildlife sanctuaries. Midwest may not legally
continue operating its heliport. If Midwest continues to disturb the
Pond, the Trust could sue to obtain a court order against Midwest to
refrain from such interference. Midwest would almost certainly obey
such an order, since the penalty for violating it would be a severe
criminal contempt of court sanction.
Midwest has apparently made a similar conclusion. Hoping to
improve its image as a friend of the environment, however, Midwest
has offered to pay the Trust for the right to continue to operate its
heliport at a reasonable price and on favorable terms. If Midwest
pays the Trust, Midwest could legally continue operating its heliport.
If members of the Trust then took any steps to interfere with
Midwest's activities, Midwest would be able to sue to obtain a court
order against the Trust to refrain from such interference. Members of
the Trust would almost certainly obey such an order, since the pen-
alty for violating it would be a severe criminal contempt of court sanc-
tion.
The Trust obviously has limited funds. Money from the sale of
this right to Midwest would increase the budget for other projects. In
particular, if Midwest pays the Trust, it will have enough money to
purchase an island off the coast of Eastern Canada that is a breeding
area for the rare harp seal. The island ("Seal Island") is currently
owned by the Canadian government, which has begun allowing fish-
ermen to place lobster traps just off its shores. The fishermen mean
no harm, but now disturb what would otherwise be a prime breeding
ground for the seals. Purchase of Seal Island would allow the Trust to
keep the fishermen at a comfortable distance. Furthermore, if fish-
ermen are not kept away from the island this spring, the seals will
probably stop using the island indefinitely. Thus, it is critical that
the Trust purchase the island as soon as possible. The sale of rights
to Henry's Pond would make it possible to buy Seal Island, but other-
wise the Trust lacks the funds to buy Seal Island in time.
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Ecologists in the group are divided over which project would be
more valuable. Both the migrating birds of Henry's Pond and the
harp seals are rare and verge on being endangered. Some also argue
that it makes sense to sacrifice Henry's Pond for other projects.
Others contend that the job of protecting Henry's Pond is complete
and the Trust should not sacrifice what it has already gained. All
want your opinion, as a valued advisor.
What do you suggest that the Trust do? (Check the option that best
reflects your opinion)
- Definitely do not sell the rights to Midwest and do not purchase
Seal Island
Probably should not sell the rights to Midwest and do not pur-
chase Seal Island
Don't know which to do-too close to call
Probably should sell rights to Midwest and purchase Seal Island
Definitely should sell rights to Midwest and purchase Seal Island
If the Trust decides not to sell Midwest's rights to operate, how likely
is it that Midwest will operate the heliport near the Pond in spite of
the Trust's newly acquired rights?
Extremely unlikely




If the Trust decides to sell Midwest's rights, what ecological value, if
any, will the Pond retain?
Basically no ecological value will remain
Very little ecological value will remain
- Some small ecological value will remain
- A moderate level of ecological value will remain
- A great deal of ecological value will remain
Which of the following best reflects your position on the environment?
I am extremely concerned about protecting the environment
- I am concerned about protecting the environment
I am somewhat concerned about protecting the environment
I am slightly concerned about protecting the environment
I am not concerned about protecting the environment
1998] 1579
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW




Imagine that you graduated many years ago. After school, you
organized a start-up biotechnology company. You provided the busi-
ness and finance background for the company with four other part-
ners who have advanced degrees in various sciences. Your firm has
worked on a number of projects, some of which generated viable prod-
ucts, although your firm has not had any resounding financial suc-
cess. This has occasionally led to some lean and difficult financial
times for your young company, but you have always managed to find
financing to tide you over any rough periods.
One year ago, you made a momentous decision for your com-
pany. After careful study, you proposed to abandon the company's
focus on therapeutic drugs and to begin working on new, organic
pesticides. You persuaded your partners that without this adjust-
ment, competition from existing pharmaceutical companies would
eventually make your venture unprofitable. Although your proposal
sparked heated disagreement among your partners, you ultimately
won them over.
Shortly thereafter, your new strategy paid off in a number of
small successes and one product with vast potential. Using the sap
from a rare Hawaiian plant, the Iwihi Bush, one of your partners
extracted an enzyme that, when sprayed on wheat, makes it virtually
immune to a common, destructive fungus. Currently, chemical pesti-
cides are available that perform the same function, but all of these are
known carcinogens. Such pesticides have increasingly been found in
ground water throughout the Midwest and may be the cause of nu-
merous health problems in farm workers. Your new substance (which
you call Iwihi-101) has no such side effects. This new product has
enormous potential, and could replace pesticides that now have $20
million in annual sales, collectively.
There are some problems with your efforts to go forward with
Iwihi-101, however. The Iwihi Bush is an endangered species found
only in a small valley on the island of Hawaii, on land owned entirely
[sic] the Del-Mott Fruit Company. Del-Mott allowed your partners
onto its land to bio-prospect for valuable plants, and allowed them to
remove several specimens, which now grow in your company's green-
house. Since the discovery of Iwihi-101, however, Del-Mott has re-
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stricted access to its property. You have learned that Del-Mott is
owned by a much larger chemical company, which produces one of the
pesticides with which Iwihi-101 would compete. Del-Mott subse-
quently destroyed all of the Iwihi Bushes on its property, apparently
in an attempt to keep your company from developing its new pesti-
cide. Fortunately, your partners are certain that the plants can be
grown in greenhouses to provide an adequate supply for commercial
sale of Iwihi-101.
Del-Mott initially demanded the return of all Iwihi Bushes in
your possession. Fortunately, your attorneys inform you that you
need not do so. When it allowed your partners to remove the bushes,
Del-Mott effectively relinquished its right to those plants and they
now belong to your company. Indeed, Del-Mott's subsequent behavior
suggests that they agree with your attorneys. They have offered to
buy all of the plants in your possession. Under the terms offered by
Del-Mott, you would assure them that you have provided all samples,
seeds, and cuttings from the Iwihi plants. Should you then fail to
turn them all over, Del-Mott could later get a court order requiring
you to return them, and then a failure to do so would result in a
criminal contempt sanction.
If you sell the plants to Del-Mott, you would not be able to
market Iwihi-101 and you believe that Del-Mott will destroy the
plants, leaving the species extinct. They have, however, offered a
substantial sum for the return of the plants. They have offered
enough money that your company would be able to engage in substan-
tial research and marketing efforts for its other products. You would
also be able to eliminate all of your firm's debt load and have enough
assets left over that you would be able to issue a public offering of
stock, which has been your primary goal since you started the com-
pany. Such an offering would put your company on a firm financial
footing for an indefinite period.
What do you suggest that your company do? (Check the option that
best reflects your opinion)
- Definitely should not sell the plants to Del-Mott
- Probably should not sell the plants to Del-Mott
Don't know which to do-too close to call
Probably should sell the plants to Del-Mott
Definitely should sell the plants to Del-Mott
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If you had to make a choice now, which would you do? (Circle one)
Do not sell the plants Sell the plants
Why? (Briefly)
If you sell the plants, what is the likelihood that the Iwihi Bush will
become extinct?
No chance that the Iwihi Bush will become extinct
0-10% chance that the Iwihi Bush will become extinct
10-25% chance that the Iwihi Bush will become extinct
25-50% chance that the Iwihi Bush will become extinct
50-100% chance that the Iwihi Bush will become extinct
If you sell the plants, what are the chances that your company will be
able to market Iwihi-101?
No chance that your company will be able to market Iwihi-101
- 0-10% chance that your company will be able to market Iwihi-101
10-25% chance that your company will be able to market Iwihi-
101
25-50% chance that your company will be. able to market Iwihi-
101
- 50-100% chance that your company will be able to market Iwihi-
101
Which of the following best reflects your position on the environment?
_ I am extremely concerned about protecting the environment
_ I am concerned about protecting the environment
_ I am somewhat concerned about protecting the environment
_ I am slightly concerned about protecting the environment
_ I am not concerned about protecting the environment
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